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Abstract
Background: Routine immunization coverage in Nigeria has remained low, and studies have identified a lack of 
accountability as a barrier to high performance in the immunization system. Accountability lies at the heart of various 
health systems strengthening efforts recently launched in Nigeria, including those related to immunization. Our aim 
was to understand the views of health officials on the accountability challenges hindering immunization service delivery 
at various levels of government. 
Methods: A semi-structured questionnaire was used to interview immunization and primary healthcare (PHC) officials 
from national, state, local, and health facility levels in Niger State in north central Nigeria. Individuals were selected to 
represent a range of roles and responsibilities in the immunization system. The questionnaire explored concepts related 
to internal accountability using a framework that organizes accountability into three axes based upon how they drive 
change in the health system. 
Results: Respondents highlighted accountability challenges across multiple components of the immunization system, 
including vaccine availability, financing, logistics, human resources, and data management. A major focus was the 
lack of clear roles and responsibilities both within institutions and between levels of government. Delays in funding, 
especially at lower levels of government, disrupted service delivery. Supervision occurred less frequently than necessary, 
and the limited decision space of managers prevented problems from being resolved. Motivation was affected by the 
inability of officials to fulfill their responsibilities. Officials posited numerous suggestions to improve accountability, 
including clarifying roles and responsibilities, ensuring timely release of funding, and formalizing processes for 
supervision, problem solving, and data reporting. 
Conclusion: Weak accountability presents a significant barrier to performance of the routine immunization system 
and high immunization coverage in Nigeria. As one stakeholder in ensuring the performance of health systems, 
routine immunization officials reveal critical areas that need to be prioritized if emerging interventions to improve 
accountability in routine immunization are to have an effect.
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Background 
Interest in accountability in health is rapidly rising, with 
several reviews recently published,1-5 multiple donor and civil 
society networks organized,6,7 research initiatives underway,8 
and a global strategy for women’s, children’s, and adolescent’s 
health, with a strong focus on accountability, launched in 
2010 by the United Nations Secretary-General.9,10 Most efforts 
to address accountability in health systems have focused on 
external accountability, ie, how communities interact with 
the system to improve responsiveness.7,11,12 However, internal 
accountability, which involves the interactions of technical, 
managerial, and political actors within government, is of 
equal importance, and plays a foundational role in the quality 
of healthcare services.3,13,14 
In Nigeria, accountability is also a concern for health services, 
including immunization.12,15 Routine immunization coverage 
in Nigeria has fluctuated in recent years, with only 38% 
of children reached with three doses of the DPT3/Penta3 
vaccine (Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey [DHS] 
2013); this compares to 68% in neighboring Cameroon (DHS 
2011), and 89% in nearby, high-performing Ghana (DHS 
2014).16-18 There is significant heterogeneity in the strength 
of routine immunization systems among Nigerian states, and 
studies have attributed poor performance to accountability 
challenges crosscutting governance, service delivery, finance, 
human resources, logistics, and data management.19-22 
Nigeria has a decentralized healthcare system, with 
responsibility for tertiary, secondary, and primary healthcare 
(PHC) assigned to the federal, state, and local levels, 
respectively. Management of the delivery of primary healthcare 
services, including immunization, falls to local governments, 
which typically have the least resources and capacity.23 State 
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Implications for policy makers
• Routine immunization coverage in Nigeria has remained low, and studies have identified a lack of accountability as a barrier to high performance 
in the immunization system.
• Accountability can be conceptualized as dynamic dimensions framed by three counterbalancing axis: power to spark change; ability to support 
change; justice to steer change.
• Nigerian health officials highlighted several accountability challenges – especially inconsistent availability of vaccines and funding, unclear roles 
and responsibilities, poor coordination across levels of government, limited decision space and managerial discretion of lower level officials, 
and need for increased supervision – which overlap and reinforce each other to prevent high performance of the routine immunization system. 
• As an important and knowledgeable stakeholder in ensuring the performance of health systems, views of routine immunization officials should 
to be prioritized if emerging interventions to improve accountability in routine immunization are to have a positive effect.
• As Nigerian authorities endeavour to improve immunization service delivery, and strengthen the health system more broadly, research should 
aim to evaluate these programs and policies to provide insight into how to address accountability challenges facing the health sector. 
Implications for the public
Successful delivery of vaccines to health facilities and communities requires coordination among many health officials at the national, state, and 
local levels that together compose the health system. Immunization coverage in Nigeria is low, and research has attributed this shortcoming to a lack 
of accountability, in other words, an inability to clearly define roles and responsibilities; provide inputs like vaccines and funding; motivate health 
officials and enforce penalties when necessary; and include all of the relevant stakeholders, such as community members, political leaders, and 
government health officials. Through interviews with health officials in Niger State in north central Nigeria, this study identified unclear roles and 
responsibilities and unavailability of inputs as key obstacles to high performance of the immunization system. Improvement of accountability will 
play a central role in the efforts of Nigerian authorities to improve immunization coverage, and research should aim to evaluate new programs and 
policies. 
Key Messages 
governments provide oversight and support in PHC delivery, 
for example, through vaccine stock management and health 
facility supervision. Federal government agencies, including 
the Federal Ministry of Health and National Primary 
Healthcare Development Agency (NPHCDA), are tasked 
with providing technical assistance and policy direction. 
In an attempt to eliminate accountability challenges associated 
with the fragmentation of service delivery across levels of 
government, in 2011, Nigeria rolled out the Primary Health 
Care Under One Roof initiative in line with the National 
Council on Health’s 2010 recommendation.24 This initiative 
aims to improve ownership and lines of authority by integrating 
all aspects of primary healthcare – finance, management, and 
implementation – under one state level authority, the State 
Primary Healthcare Development Agency.25 Several Nigerian 
states have already established such institutions, although the 
status of their implementation, and the extent to which they 
meet the guidelines set forth by NPHCDA, varies greatly.26 
In 2013, health officials and civil society partners in Nigeria 
developed the Accountability Framework for Routine 
Immunization (AFRIN) in Nigeria, which defines roles, 
responsibilities, and reporting structures for the routine 
immunization system.27,28 AFRIN also outlines rewards 
and sanctions to help enforce these responsibilities, and 
indicators for monitoring the performance of the system. The 
development of AFRIN is a critical step towards improving 
accountability in the routine immunization system. However, 
AFRIN still needs to be operationalized, and strategies to 
implement AFRIN are under development. 
To aid AFRIN’s future implementation, we undertook this 
qualitative study to understand the views of immunization 
and health officials on the challenges to internal accountability 
and barriers to high performance in the immunization system 
across the national, state, local, and health facility levels in 
Nigeria. 
Methods
This study was conducted primarily in Niger State in the 
north central geopolitical zone of Nigeria, with additional 
interviews of national officials occurring in Abuja, Federal 
Capital Territory. Niger State is mostly rural and agrarian with 
a population of roughly 4 million people living in 25 local 
government areas (LGAs).29 Delivery of immunization is the 
responsibility of the State Ministry of Health and State Primary 
Healthcare Development Agency, and occurs at nearly all of 
the state’s 1322 public and privately owned PHC centers, 12 
secondary facilities, and a single tertiary facility, although the 
majority of the burden falls to PHC centers, which are often 
understaffed and underequipped.30 Immunization coverage 
in Niger State is low and varies across LGAs. Among children 
aged 12-23 months, three dose DPT3/Penta3 coverage in 
Niger State was 37% in 2013.16 
Following an exploratory aim, our study qualitatively 
interviewed 17 government health officials and healthcare 
workers involved in routine immunization activities at 
the national, state, LGA, and health facility levels (Table). 
Purposive sampling was utilized to capture maximum 
variation in experience across the routine immunization 
system and within each level of government. 
Interviews were framed as a discussion of issues related to 
accountability and routine immunization for the purpose 
of developing strategies to improve performance of the 
Nigerian system. Interview guides were structured according 
to an accountability framework previously developed by our 
research team, which was informed by a literature review 
on how and why accountability initiatives work.31 This 
framework organizes elements of accountability into three 
axes based upon how they drive change in health systems. The 
axis of ability supports change by enabling service delivery 
actors with formal rules outlining roles, responsibilities, and 
standards that appropriately expand their authority to act, 
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and the informal norms and inputs that support change in 
performance. The axis of power sparks change by wielding 
‘sticks’ that curb their potential abuse of power or neglect 
of duty, and also by offering ‘carrots’ that incentivize the 
constructive agency of service delivery actors. Lastly, the axis 
of justice steers the strategic direction of change by balancing 
political leadership, community ownership, and social equity, 
so that accountability efforts support progressive change, 
rather than being captured by self-interests (Figure).31
Semi-structured individual interviews, lasting 30-60 minutes, 
were conducted in English and digitally recorded. Interviews 
were transcribed, entered into NVivo™ 10 (QSR International) 
and reviewed using thematic content analysis. Responses 
were coded following an initial codebook, based upon our 
nine accountability domains and sub-concepts within those 
domains. After testing the coding structure on a few key 
transcripts, the codebook was revised and applied to both 
subsequent and previously coded segments.32,33 Common 
themes emerging from the data were mapped according to 
each area of accountability in our framework. 
Results 
Results are presented according to elements of accountability 
in Figure, including the axis of ability: formal rules, informal 
norms, authority, and inputs; the axis of power: carrots to 
entice constructive agency and sticks to reduce abuse of power 
or neglect of duty; and the axis of justice: political leadership, 
community ownership, and social equity. Quotes in the text 
are referenced by an anonymous identifier, indicating the 
level of government and respondent number (H = health 
facility, L = LGA, S = state, and N = national). 
Axis of Ability
Formal Rules: Roles, Responsibilities, and Standards 
Many of the health and immunization officials surveyed had job 
responsibilities focused exclusively on routine immunization, 
particularly at higher levels of government (national and 
state). At lower levels, especially at the health facility level, 
respondents tended to have multiple responsibilities related 
to delivery of PHC, of which routine immunization and mass 
immunization campaigns were only a part. 
At the national and state level, provision of an appointment 
letter, job description, or list of responsibilities occurred in 
some cases, in contrast to the LGA and health facility levels. 
Most officials at the LGA and health facility levels were given 
only verbal instructions about their role and responsibilities 
at the start of employment. Several respondents had already 
Table. Demographic and Employment Characteristics of Study Participants
National State LGA HF
Respondents 4 3 4 6
Agea 46 41 45 37
Proportion male 100% 100% 75% 33%
Years worked in healthcarea 21 12 21 9
Years worked in immunizationa 12 10 12 8
Years worked in current positiona 3 5 6 3
Abbreviations: LGA, local government area; HF, health facility.
a Mean.
 
Figure. Conceptual Framework: Dynamic Dimensions of Accountability in 
Health Systems Along the Axes of Power, Ability, and Justice (from George 
et al31).
been working in the healthcare system when they were offered 
their current position, and moved from one position to the 
next, sometimes without sufficient orientation. 
At the national and state levels, reported use of guidelines and 
standard operating procedures was more common than at LGA 
and health facility levels, where few had written guidelines or 
standard operating procedures for their work, although some 
participants reported using standing orders for clinical care. 
When asked if they were provided any guidelines for their 
work, one state official responded, “not specifically, most of 
the things I learn on the job and [in] training (S1).” Another 
state official reported using guidelines for the administration 
of immunizations, as well as guidelines for the management 
of mass immunization campaigns. Several respondents said 
that it would be helpful to have written guidelines for their 
responsibilities, especially in cases where their supervisor is 
unavailable or mistakenly provides incorrect information. 
One national level respondent explained, “health is a collective 
responsibility…but if you don’t put clear plans on ground to 
define roles…there will be confusion and wasted effort, and 
that has played [out] over the year while we were trying to 
establish guidelines and standards for people to follow (N3).”
When asked about what performance standards or targets 
exist in their work environment, health facility respondents 
typically referred to the number of immunization sessions 
held. At the LGA level, officials focused on submitting 
their monthly reports on time. Several officials mentioned 
immunization coverage targets as important benchmarks for 
performance.
A few respondents stated that the lack of formalized 
responsibilities leads to difficultly in holding staff accountable. 
One health facility official suggested that a schedule of duties 
would improve accountability, and a national level official 
stated that periodic reorientation on roles and responsibilities 
were needed for health workers in the immunization 
system. Despite the lack of formalized responsibilities, all 
respondents could explain in very general terms the basic 
responsibilities associated with their jobs. Many officials 
directly recommended clarifying roles and responsibilities 
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as a possible intervention to improve accountability and 
performance in Niger State’s routine immunization system. 
Informal Norms
Although interviews focused primarily on formal 
accountability areas, respondents did raise some issues related 
to informal norms in the context of the other elements of our 
accountability framework. At the national level, there was 
an explicit recognition of the presence of informal norms. 
Commenting on the start of their current position, one 
official stated, what “I actually met was series of traditions 
that [the] people that occupied the table before me had 
undertaken, [but] I try to define the way I see the job [to be] 
more impactful (N3).” 
Authority: Decision Space and Managerial Discretion
Responses to questions regarding decision space and 
managerial discretion concerned the ability of supervisors to 
discipline poorly performing supervisees, and the inability 
of supervisors to access funding for activities. For example, 
a health facility and several LGA officials spoke about not 
having the authority to recommend the transfer of employees 
that do not perform to expected standards or refuse to 
cooperate. 
Officials at all levels of the immunization system mentioned 
the need for more authority to access and disburse funding 
for routine immunization activities. Without this authority, 
they face delays in service delivery while waiting for 
funding, and often waste time because they have to visit 
their supervisors “cap-in-hand everyday” until funding is 
released (S1). Similarly, state officials reported not having 
sufficient authority to release vaccines and supplies, such 
as immunization data collection forms, which are used 
to track the number of vaccines delivered to each health 
facility. Another state official relayed that in the face of 
delays in provision of data collection forms from the national 
government, officials “always improvise,” and “instead of 
having all of the data tools available, they spend out of their 
own money” to photocopy forms (S3). 
An LGA official reported that when there are problems, 
like vaccine shortages, they often reach out to local political 
leaders, such as the LGA chairman (the highest elected official 
at the LGA level). In some cases, political leaders will resolve 
the problem through their authority and network of personal 
influence. Other times, immunization officials will not 
receive any response from these leaders, and will be forced to 
wait until higher levels of government take action. One LGA 
official explained that sometimes if an action is taken without 
consulting the LGA chairman, the chairman will respond by 
saying that “you are becoming too powerful for him (L3).” In 
another instance, officials could not act without the chairman, 
who was out of town, and were delayed until they were able 
to reach him by text message, at which point the chairman 
helped to sort out their problem. 
To alleviate delays created by waiting for the action of 
supervisors and political leaders, a health facility official 
suggested direct “allocation [of vaccines and supplies] to 
every facility…from the state (H3).” Similarly, at the state 
level, respondents suggested decentralizing decision-making 
and “delegating authority,” citing instances when they must 
“wait for an authority to approve transportation, logistics,” 
which “sometimes takes one, two, three days,” and negatively 
impacts their work (S3, S1). Another state official said, “there 
should be a structure where the request (for generator fuel) 
doesn’t have to come to me. [LGA officials] can be empowered 
to handle some responsibilities too (S2).” An LGA level official 
explained that they had previously acted without approval, 
only to be reprimanded later. When asked about ways to 
prevent this type of conflict over authority with a supervisor, 
the official offered, “try to be…transparent, respect must [be 
present], and we must…avoid a communication gap between 
us (L4).” 
While most officials reported frustration with delays 
due to inability to authorize spending, one national level 
immunization official also noted that communication with 
the community could improve if there was “more freedom 
to…talk to the media about our programs [without having] to 
wait to get clearance from higher authority (N3).” 
Supervision 
Officials across levels of government reported an inability 
to conduct sufficient supervision of facilities and staff 
under their management. State officials commented on 
not having enough time, transportation, or funds to go out 
on supervision visits. In response to a question about what 
could be done to improve supervision, one official responded, 
“first and foremost is the logistics, in terms of transportation. 
Funds for [supervision visits]…[are] totally unavailable (S1).” 
Without these supervision visits, state officials have no way 
of knowing whether LGA officials are properly visiting (at 
least one visit per health facility per month) and supervising 
the health facilities under their jurisdiction. One LGA official 
said that with money for transportation they could visit 
officials from rural areas because when these officials “see 
new faces…[they] take it more seriously, and when [we] do 
[this supervision] regularly, it will improve the work (L1).” 
Beyond the frequency of supervision, the purpose, 
content, and quality of supervision differed across levels of 
government. Several health facility officials stated that their 
interactions with their supervisors, typically officials from the 
LGA level, were limited solely to reporting when vaccines are 
low and requesting reimbursements for transportation. Other 
officials reported that when they are able to interact with their 
supervisor, for example, by reviewing routine immunization 
session plans or ledgers for storing vaccine stock balances, 
they learned from the interaction, and that it helped with 
problem solving. One LGA official explained that supervision 
“helps to solve problems, [and] the instruction [supervisors] 
give, I pass on to my colleagues in the field (L2).” A state 
official offered, “the feeling of knowing that someone is 
there to help solve a problem helps me a lot (S2).” Officials 
seemed to report problems to their supervisors or political 
officials as they arose, typically through informal, verbal 
means of communication, either in person or by phone or text 
message, when collecting vaccines from the store or during 
a supervision visit. However, officials would sometimes face 
a long wait until the problem is resolved or find it is never 
addressed. 
Officials described supervision as able to generate motivation 
for high performance among supervisees and foster an 
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environment of improved communication. Officials found 
it motivating when supervisors respond to their requests 
and consult with their supervisees in the decision-making 
process. An LGA official reported that supervision has the 
effect of “making me face my work with seriousness (L1).” 
Some officials reported that they reach out to their supervisors 
when their responsibilities were unclear. For example, a local 
official said, “it is for my superior to guide me on the job.… 
What I don’t know, I will ask my superior officer to tell me 
(L2).” Another LGA official pointed to the need to develop 
supervision guidelines for managers, saying that when “you 
are going out to supervise and you don’t know what you [need 
to] supervise, then [your effort is] rubbish (L4).” Negative 
behaviors of supervisors were reported by respondents to be 
demotivating, including when supervisors promise to visit a 
health facility but do not follow through, or when they get 
angry and shout at supervisees.
Inputs 
Our interview guides explored a range of inputs, such as 
vaccines, supplies, funding, data, and human resources, all 
required to deliver immunization services. 
1. Funding
Respondents reported insufficient or late funding 
disbursements for PHC activities, including immunization, 
to be a major impediment to their ability to carryout their 
activities, and many listed specific examples of activities that 
were interrupted because of unavailable funding. Mobility 
was closely tied to funding, whether through absence of a 
vehicle, fuel, or cash for public transport, and was reported 
as a common impediment to vaccine collection, delivery, 
and supervision across government. LGA and health facility 
officials said they take steps to deliver vaccines and fulfill 
their responsibilities despite not having the required funding. 
Respondents emphasized that consistent availability of 
funding would lead to increased productivity. 
At health facilities, activities affected by unavailability of 
funding included vaccine collection and outreach sessions. 
One health facility respondent explained that when there 
is no money for fuel, they use their “legs to get to some of 
the villages surrounding” their office (H3). In response to 
probing about how they reach farther villages, the respondent 
answered, “to be realistic, what you are supposed to do cannot 
be done at times, even though you try (H3).” At the LGA level, 
challenges included funding for transportation for health 
facility supervision and cold chain equipment maintenance. 
An LGA official explained, “presently one of the fridges is bad 
and here there is no money to repair it (L2).” When probed 
about whether they had reported this problem, the respondent 
said, “they have heard [about] it, and they have to think of a 
way forward,…unless money comes,” nothing will be done 
(L2). Another explained, “when there is no [power] and 
we can’t use the generator [because there is no funding] we 
sometimes drive to the state capital…to get ice packs, and in 
two or three days we come again for more (L1).” This reduced 
the time available for officials to spend on supervision. 
2. Human resources 
At the LGA and health facility levels, too few staff was also a 
frequently reported problem. One health facility respondent 
seemed satisfied with the number of staff at their facility, but 
others reported that the number of staff in their facility was 
insufficient for their routine immunization activities and 
the number of people they typically serve. Insufficiencies in 
staff capacity and distribution contribute to this problem, for 
example, a health facility respondent explained that although 
they have an extra staff person to assist with immunization, 
this individual is not trained to administer vaccines, which 
creates a bottleneck during immunization sessions. A health 
facility official noted that some individuals are overburdened 
with multiple responsibilities. “In each clinic we have two 
people [for routine immunization]. They are the same people 
that carryout clinical work in the hospital, and when they 
leave…we will be closed (H5).” A national level official noted 
that although the number of recommended vaccines has 
increased since the country’s immunization program was 
begun, the human resources to deliver these vaccines has not 
risen proportionately. 
Officials at all levels of government expressed interest in 
learning more through trainings and on-the-job instruction. 
Trainings were viewed by some as motivational and a 
reward for good performance. Most officials claimed that 
the trainings they had participated in were beneficial and 
helped to improve their performance. Health facility officials 
reported recent participation in several trainings, including 
those for mass immunization campaigns, preparation for 
introduction of new vaccines (eg, pentavalent vaccine), and 
maternal, newborn, and child health (MNCH) and integrated 
community case management (ICCM) programs. One area 
of training mentioned frequently, especially by LGA officials, 
but also those at higher levels of government, was data 
management and computer use. 
3. Supplies
Health facility respondents also reported shortages of vaccines 
and supplies (especially immunization data collection forms). 
This sometimes leaves officials with no choice but to turn 
caregivers and children away, at which point women “will 
be discouraged and…won’t come [back] again” for their 
child’s vaccinations (H2). LGA officials cited problems with 
maintaining and powering cold chain equipment, especially 
with inconsistent electricity from the power grid, insufficient 
funding for generator fuel, or damaged equipment. An LGA 
official, for example, reported using ordinary refrigerators 
that were not part of the program to keep vaccines cool when 
the cold chain equipment was out of service. A state official 
mentioned feeling demotivated when LGA officials travel 
from a far distance to pick up vaccines only to be told that the 
required vaccines are not available. Officials at LGA, state, and 
national levels of government cited needing a “little support 
[with] the modern challenges,” including computers and 
insufficient internet access for stock management, sending 
reports, and other communications (S3). An LGA official 
noted that the recent switch to electronic data entry alleviated 
delays caused previously due to stockouts of paper data 
collection forms. Challenges related to infrastructure, namely 
the limited availability of electricity through the national 
power grid and the poor road network, were mentioned 
briefly by several state and national officials. 
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A national level official noted that financing for immunization 
is embedded in the budgetary processes of the national 
government, and because vaccines must be procured months 
in advance, delays in release of healthcare funding from the 
federal government can lead to unavailability of vaccines at 
the state level. State level officials echoed this sentiment as a 
reason for delays, which they explained are then propagated 
to lower levels of government. 
4. Data
Officials at lower levels of government explained that 
supervisors visit their facility to correct mistakes and incorrect 
practices of data collection, summarization, and submission 
(related to timeliness). The extent to which reported data 
is analysed at higher levels of government and feedback to 
LGAs and health facilities was not clear. However, LGA and 
state officials review immunization coverage and vaccine 
and logistics data for planning purposes and to address 
problems. An LGA official gave an example, saying, we have 
“low coverage in this ward, and…their problem [is] that this 
clinic didn’t come for vaccines or didn’t do immunization for 
the month. After I submit the data, [my supervisor] will say I 
should call” the facility to determine why the missed sessions 
occurred (L1). Although officials said that they report data on 
the number of immunizations delivered in their facility every 
month, this does not necessarily lead to improved availability 
of vaccines and supplies. An official explained that the 
recent introduction of the vaccine dashboard, a new system 
for vaccine stock management, has helped to alleviate this 
situation. In the “past few months things have improved with 
this vaccine dashboard…it helps me monitor my stock levels 
at the LGAs…and call to order any erring LGA leaders as soon 
as they bring in their reports (S1).” A national official agreed 
that the dashboard has helped fulfill their responsibilities 
related to vaccine stock management. 
Axis of Power
Incentives and Motivation
Motivation among officials was affected by many of 
the same areas of accountability emphasized above, but 
especially the availability of inputs, such as vaccines, 
infrastructure, equipment, supplies, transportation, and 
funding. Respondents at all levels of government reported 
being frustrated and demotivated by their inability to carryout 
their responsibilities due to these lapses. Several officials 
stated that simply ensuring the availability of inputs to fulfill 
their responsibilities would provide sufficient motivation. A 
state level official specifically mentioned feeling motivated by 
recent improvements in stock and data management through 
the vaccine dashboard system. A few officials mentioned 
“being overloaded” with work as demotivating (N4). 
Participants tended to discuss motivation in two contexts, 
how to motivate or incentivise high-performers, and how to 
ensure a positive working environment. 
Suggestions for how motivate high-performers or increase 
motivation generally included both financial and non-
financial strategies. A few LGA and health facility officials 
suggested raising salaries and increasing clinic and office 
space, although others at multiple levels of government were 
content with their salaries. A state official said, “I don’t want 
incentives to be financial, [just] give me enough airtime to 
report…and a computer [so] I can [send] feedback to the 
LGAs.” The same official explained that, outside of mass 
immunization activities, they have little funding for logistics 
and office costs (S1).
Officials at the health facility level mentioned individual or 
health facility recognition for high-performance as motivating. 
Officials suggested incentives in the form of recognition 
through “congratulatory messages,” a “certificate to show 
that I have tried,” or “receiving either verbal [appreciation] or 
an award related to what you are doing, [so] you know you 
are doing a good job (S2, H2, L4).” A national level official 
noted that to properly recognize high-performers, roles and 
responsibilities need to first be clearly defined, to serve as a 
benchmark for performance of health workers. 
Other suggestions for improved motivation from respondents 
at all levels of government included training or promotion 
opportunities for high-performers. A national level official 
suggested, instead of monetary incentives, focusing on 
capacity building and “identifying people that have really 
done well and elevating them to a level [where]…they will 
push further (N4).” 
Supervision also played a role in raising the level of motivation 
among officials more generally. An official at the LGA level 
mentioned increased supportive supervision as a potential 
motivator. LGA and health facility officials were discouraged 
by negative attitudes of their supervisors, especially the 
occurrence of shouting when supervisors visit to correct 
mistakes. An LGA official reported that when supervisors 
“promise visiting…a health facility, and…don’t come, [this] 
will not motivate [health workers] (L1).” Two officials, at the 
LGA and national level, recognized the importance of quality 
supervision, recognition for good work, inclusion in decision-
making, and “personal relationships” on the motivation of 
their supervisees (N4). 
Respondents seemed to highly value, and reported being 
motivated by, the humanitarian aspect of their work, 
particularly the ability to provide services that benefit women 
and children. Attitudes and actions of the community can 
clearly affect the motivation of health workers, both positively 
and negatively. A state official said, “my motivation is when 
I hear or see that the risk for polio is actually dropping, that 
means we are getting something done (S2).” An LGA official 
explained, “I love my job, especially [working with] the 
pregnant women and children. They want someone who is able 
to help them, so the passion for them is one of the motivating 
factors (L3).” Turning away mothers and children due to 
vaccines shortages was mentioned as highly demotivating. 
The same LGA official reported as demotivating the poor 
“attitudes of the workers (L3).” 
A national official recognized many of the motivating and 
demotivating factors reported by officials at lower levels of 
government, saying “I…feel a good working environment 
[is needed] for [officials] so they won’t scramble for field 
assignments to earn extra money and training. Other basic 
needs should be [available], [including] salaries flowing 
regularly, [and officials should not be] struggling for water, 
electricity, and adequate security (N3).” This official continued, 
“generally motivation is very low in government because of 
[the lack of] these basic needs (N3).” This official added that 
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incentives will only function as incentives when salaries are 
sufficient and received in a timely manner. Another national 
level official suggested that they “put [in place] the processes 
that will clearly define roles and responsibilities, improve 
on the capacity of people along the line, and recognize good 
performances (N4).” 
Penalties and Sanctions 
LGA and health facility officials generally reported that they 
had few problems holding their supervisees accountable for 
their responsibilities or with other related issues, such as 
absenteeism. However, when faced with a poor performing 
supervisee, supervisors described experiencing both positive 
and negative outcomes after attempting to discuss the problem 
with the supervisee. One health facility official explained that 
when they have an underperforming staff person, “I will talk 
to them and [ask] them to behave, [I have] never had any case 
where they repeat” the behavior (H2). An LGA level official 
described the difficulties with addressing poor performance 
in an environment where the possibility of enforcing penalties 
is low: “you find something happening and you try to address 
it, but the person is not ready to comply, and you try to sort it 
[out] at your level, [but they still] refuse (L4).” A state official 
explained that the lack of sanctions negatively impacts the 
process of supervision: “I visited a health facility two or three 
times, [and suggested] corrections, [but when I] went back, [I] 
found the same thing on the ground again. I indicated [this] 
in my report, but no action was taken. It’s so demoralizing 
(S1).”
No health facility officials interviewed had ever reported 
anyone to their own supervisors for poor performance or 
negligence. When LGA and state officials mentioned filing 
such reports, serious action was typically not taken. A listing 
of penalties for civil servants does exist, but many said that it 
is not frequently utilized. Only a few participants could recall 
any instance where penalties, such as withholding salary or 
suspension, were enforced. Yet despite how rarely penalties are 
applied, officials did describe these penalties as effective when 
enforced. One LGA official recalled the impact of previous 
cases of suspension and withholding of salary: “when you 
punish [a supervisee], they come back to their senses…and 
perform better (L3).” 
Officials suggested that the ability to cut salaries, transfer, 
suspend, or fire employees should be more of a real possibility 
for penalties to have an impact on performance. It was noted 
that, for penalties to be effective, enforcement would need 
to be unhindered by the connections the poor performer 
has to influential people in the system or community. A 
national level official also explained that establishment and 
enforcement of penalties requires certain enabling structures, 
such as clearly defined roles, responsibilities, standards, and 
performance targets.
Axis of Justice
Political Leadership, Community Ownership, and Social Equity 
LGA and health facility officials most frequently interacted 
with political or community leaders when problems arose, 
or when announcing news of a pending an immunization 
campaign or outreach session to the community. In general, 
immunization officials felt that support of politicians 
or community leaders was inconsistent, and very much 
dependent upon the interest of individual leaders in 
immunization and PHC. Several remarked that political and 
community leaders could be more active in supporting the 
immunization system, especially in educating the community 
about immunization and encouraging community demand 
for services. Of note is that any regular effort to engage with 
community leaders is not without cost. One official explained 
that funding for the food required to host a meeting with 
community leaders is frequently unavailable. This official 
explained that he has to appeal to community leaders on the 
behalf of the community’s children to secure their attendance.
A state official described a new series of quarterly meetings 
between immunization officials and LGA chairmen with 
the purpose of improving coordination and performance in 
the immunization system. Another similar set of meetings is 
being held for immunization officials and traditional leaders. 
This official said that these meetings raise the profile of 
immunization because the governor is involved. However, 
another state official stated that the pressure created does 
not extend beyond the meeting. A national level official 
also remarked on the importance of this type of effort to 
“sensitize” governors to the importance of immunization and 
PHC because they hold the authority for funding allocation 
and disbursement (N3). 
Discussion 
This qualitative exploratory study examined how different 
aspects of accountability relate to the performance of the 
routine immunization system across levels of government in 
Nigeria. Much of the discussion with participants centered 
on the axis of ability, especially inputs and capacity, but also 
roles, responsibilities, standards, and supervision. The axis of 
power, which includes incentives and motivation, penalties 
and sanctions, and decision space and managerial discretion, 
also featured prominently in the responses. The axis of justice, 
namely political leadership, community ownership, and 
social equity, had the least coverage. This may indicate that, 
according to immunization officials, inputs, capacity, roles, 
and responsibilities – the fundamental needs that support 
and enable change in the health system – are more pressing 
challenges for routine immunization in this region of Nigeria 
than other areas of accountability that are predominately 
dynamic or catalytic. Alternatively, this could reflect a 
common conceptualization of accountability observed in 
this study, especially at lower levels of government, that 
accountability concerns accounting for physical vaccine 
stock, which may have limited the discussion of other themes. 
An overarching theme evident in the findings of this study, 
and echoed by a review of similar studies, is the large 
extent to which the elements of accountability outlined 
in our framework overlap and reinforce each other.3 In 
our findings we highlight the division between areas that 
support and enable change, such as inputs, capacity, roles, 
and responsibilities, and those that are dynamic or catalytic, 
such as management practices, decision-making, incentives, 
and sanctions. In responses from participants, it was often 
difficult to determine whether the problems discussed were 
driven primarily by lack of inputs, for example, vaccines, or 
by the failure of management processes to identify where 
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these vaccines are needed and facilitate their delivery. The 
value of the accountability framework is to illustrate how 
these areas interact, either in cases of poor performance, or 
as the starting point for strategies to improve the functioning 
of the system. One example is the vaccine stock management 
“dashboard,” whose early success was cited in several contexts 
by immunization officials in this study. The dashboard 
demonstrates how clarifying roles and responsibilities and 
ensuring the availability of vaccine inputs, within a context of 
open communication and frequent supervision, can translate 
into gains in transparency, answerability, and performance. 
On the surface, officials credited the dashboard with 
achieving its intended purpose, increasing vaccine availability 
and reducing stockouts. More fundamentally, however, the 
tool functioned by alleviating obstacles to accountability, ie, 
by increasing the visibility and use of data and allowing state 
managers a quick and effective avenue for supervision of local 
immunization officials through phone calls, whose purpose 
was to correct mistakes in vaccine stock balances before new 
orders are placed and delivered. 
Poorly defined roles, responsibilities, and standards were 
identified here, and in other studies, as an impediment 
to accountability and high performance within the 
immunization system and other areas of the health sector 
in Nigeria.19,34 Previous reviews found that the definition of 
roles and standards can influence the effectiveness of health 
committees and external accountability on the responsiveness 
and quality of health services.35,36 Undoubtedly, clear 
roles, responsibilities, and standards are also essential for 
government officials in positions of technical and managerial 
leadership.3,13 
In our study, roles and responsibilities were primarily 
discussed as elements that support and enable change in the 
system, the absence of which leads to “confusion and wasted 
effort.” Overlapping relationships were identified between 
responsibilities of both officials and institutions and several 
other accountability areas in the routine immunization 
system, including inputs (especially funding), supervision, 
decision space and managerial discretion, and penalties and 
sanctions. Officials in Niger State raised this point in other 
discussions, explaining that understaffing and inconsistent 
funding force supervisors and healthcare workers to assume 
multiple and shifting roles that create confusion and disrupt 
regular activities.37 Another example of this, offered by a 
number of respondents in this study, was that supervisors 
found it difficult to hold their staff accountable and enforce 
penalties for poor performance without an official listing of 
roles and responsibilities. Here the operation of a sanction – 
an enforcement process designed to encourage accountability 
and discourage negligence – is hindered by the absence of 
clear and explicit roles and responsibilities, fundamental 
elements for any PHC system. Nigeria’s Primary Health Care 
Under One Roof initiative, discussed above, is designed to 
clarify roles and responsibilities and realign accountability 
structures through the establishment of State Primary 
Healthcare Development Agencies. 
Inputs and capacity were another major focus of the discussions 
with participants, and an area critical to accountability and 
service delivery recognized by previous studies in Nigeria 
and other countries.3,19,21,38,39 Insufficiencies in fundamental 
inputs that enable accountable operation of the immunization 
system, such as vaccine supply, data collection forms, and 
funding, interacted in important ways with the other areas 
of accountability, for instance, when insufficient funding 
prevented officials from conducting supervision visits to 
health facilities. We also found this relationship operating in 
the opposite direction, evident in instances where officials 
at lower levels of government lacked the authority to release 
funding for immunization activities. One important input, 
the salaries of immunization officials, was not mentioned 
by respondents, although the timely provision of salaries has 
been reported as a major challenge for health workers in other 
regions of Nigeria.40 
Funding was the most critical of all the inputs mentioned 
by respondents. In Nigeria, public funding for healthcare, 
education, water and sanitation, and other services is divided 
according to a predetermined formula among the three levels 
of government. Federal statutes mandate funding allocations 
to designated accounts in each state, and state officials 
determine subsequent allocations for each LGA based upon 
criteria such as population size, social development, and other 
factors.41 LGAs are responsible for earmarking and releasing 
funding for specific purposes, and many LGAs have not 
established a budget-line for PHC.30 Delays in the release of 
funding can occur at any point in this system, and at the LGA 
level, availability of funding for PHC is largely reliant upon 
the highest elected local official, the LGA chairman.42 Policies 
and strategies to improve the regularity of funding have 
been proposed, including ensuring a budget-line for routine 
immunization, consolidation of responsibility for access 
and disbursement of funding through a single state level 
agency (ie, State Primary Healthcare Development Agency), 
and state “basket funds.”30 Basket funds pool funding from 
various government, donor, and private sector sources, and 
serve to ensure adequate, timely, and transparent resources 
are available to the immunization system.42 In another forum, 
Nigerian immunization officials in Niger State proposed 
new approaches to improve timely delivery of funding, 
such as regular electronic banking transfers of funding for 
immunization and PHC to health facilities, and including 
an indicator for reporting on funding disbursements in the 
immunization data reporting system.37 
Supervision functioned to review system performance, 
generate motivation, and create a space for increased 
communication and problem solving. According to 
respondents, the regularity of supervision visits should be 
increased, but simply ensuring that supervision visits take 
place will not likely be sufficient. An immunization official 
from Niger State remarked in another forum that their 
inability to solve the problems of the health facilities under 
their supervision led them to stop visiting these facilities 
to avoid hearing repeated grievances and having to admit 
that they could not offer a solution.37 Officials in this study 
declared the need for a supervision checklist, despite the 
fact that such documents exist for routine immunization 
supportive supervision visits at both the LGA and state levels 
in Nigeria. 
Supervision is a complex and dynamic process for creating 
change, and our data, and previous research, suggest that 
the effectiveness of supervision maybe be particularly reliant 
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upon other factors in the health system, including other 
areas of accountability.43,44 An effective supervision process 
will require senior actors that prioritize making supervision 
visits happen; the availability of key inputs such as vaccines, 
funding, and cold chain equipment; effective downstream 
processes for reporting and solving problems once they are 
identified through the supervision process; and the true 
threat of sanctions for negligence (eg, absenteeism). 
Other elements of accountability were also recognized in 
this study. Decision space and managerial discretion of 
immunization officials was frequently restricted and arbitrarily 
defined. This was due in part to the lack of clear roles and 
responsibilities, and the authority of powerful actors in the 
system, such as the LGA chairman. Incentives and motivation 
and penalties and sanctions were identified as useful processes 
to encourage good performance and discourage negligence, 
especially in the face of the many challenges encountered 
by health workers in their daily experiences. Respondents 
reported on the important influence of local politicians, 
community leaders, and in some cases, community members, 
in the management of the immunization system at the local 
level.2,7,11,45 
Our study of accountability in the routine system in Nigeria 
has several limitations. This was a rapid exploratory study 
of the accountability challenges including immunization 
officials from only one state and LGA. Participant 
experiences were not necessarily representative of those 
in other areas of the country. Participants had varied 
understandings of accountability, dependent largely on their 
level of government, making synthesis of the accountability 
challenges facing the system as a whole more difficult. The 
study focused primarily on internal accountability, excluding 
the influence of potentially important interactions between 
the health system, communities, political leaders, and other 
stakeholders. Coverage of informal norms was also limited in 
the discussion on accountability and routine immunization 
with participants, and should be the topic of future research. 
Conclusion
Weak accountability presents a significant barrier to 
performance of the routine immunization system and high 
immunization coverage in Nigeria. Challenges crosscut 
governance, human resources, finance, logistics, and service 
delivery, as well as multiple areas of accountability. In this 
study, immunization officials emphasized problems related 
to roles and responsibilities, capacity and inputs, decision 
space and managerial discretion, and supervision. As one 
stakeholder in ensuring the performance of health systems, 
routine immunization officials reveal critical areas that need 
to be prioritized if the emerging interventions to improve 
accountability in routine immunization are to have a positive 
effect.
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